physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been studied and developed as powerful primitives to generate device-specific random keys, which can be used for various security applications. However, the existing memory-based PUFs need to safely buffer the data bits in the memory before it is used to produce random bits, resulting in additional area/energy consumption and potential data security issues. In this paper, we propose a new memory-based PUF that exploits the nonvolatility and random variability of emerging memory technologies to produce random bits. Unlike conventional implementations, the random bit generation process of our proposed PUF does not disturb the data bits already stored in the memory. To satisfy the quality requirements for both memory and PUF applications, we also propose a general method to find the optimal design point of emerging nonvolatile memory (eNVM)-based PUF. An illustrative design using spin-transfer torque magnetic RAM exhibits desirable results using our method. Compared to the conventional types of memory-based PUFs, eNVM-based PUFs features enhanced security as cryptographic primitives and lower area and energy cost as data storage.
the target of adversaries due to its vulnerability to physical attacks [1] , [2] . In this regard, security of data storage has become one of the most pressing issues in memory circuit/system design. Memory-based physical unclonable function (PUF) [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] have emerged as an effective solution to the security problems of cryptographic key storage and sensitive data protection, because of its simple structure, high reliability and randomness, and availability in computing platforms. Compared to other PUF instances such as ringoscillator and arbiter-based PUFs, one of the biggest advantage of memory-based PUF is that it can be used for both ordinary memory operation and PUF application [11] . Every coin has two sides, doubling a memory as key generator brings distinct benefits to secure storage, but is not without challenges.
First, the key generation process in conventional memorybased PUFs inevitably overwrites data which are already stored in the memory. Therefore, buffer storage is needed to temporarily hold the data that are presently stored in the memory until the completion of key generation process, as illustrated in Fig. 1 . On one hand, this process introduces undesired area/performance/energy overhead. On the other hand, the data buffer operations may create potential security vulnerability. For example, data remanence decay of SRAM-based MemPUF may be exploited to reveal the response bits [12] . Since powering off the volatile SRAM will not immediately lose data bits preserved in it, overwriting the SRAM-based PUF with known pattern after it has been used for key generation can result in a successful fault-injection attack to recover the response bits that have been generated. There are several countermeasures suggested [12] to deal with the problem, but these methods either introduce non-negligible performance and/or hardware implementation overhead, or require complicated cryptographic primitives.
Second, process variations of memory devices act as a double-edged sword to produce reliable and random response bits for use as PUF and increase the yield loss when the devices are used as ordinary storage elements [3] [4] [5] , [13] . Simply put, memory devices which are more susceptible to process variations, are not only more prone to skew to either state upon power-up (which is good for the generation of reliable random bits) [5] , but also more likely to fail in read/write operations. While a great deal of effort has been devoted to design memory circuitry for high qualities of PUF and low 0278-0070 c 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. failure probability of ordinary memory application independently, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , attempts to satisfy both simultaneously are rare, and none is able to avoid the need for some form of temporary data transfer or mirroring.
To overcome the aforementioned issues faced by conventional memory-based PUFs, in this paper, we propose a novel security primitive called Buffer-Free Memory-based PUF (BF-MPUF) using emerging nonvolatile memory (eNVM) technologies [phase change memory (PCM), spin-transfer torque magnetic RAM (STT-MRAM), resistive RAM (RRAM), etc.]. Compared to other types of memorybased PUFs, the benefit of using eNVM is the area and energy consumption for both memory and PUF applications can be economized. The contributions of this paper are twofold.
1) We originally propose the BF-MPUF to utilize eNVM for the generation of secret bits without disturbing the data already present in the memory. The data stored in the memory do not need to be transferred to a buffer before the response bit generation, thus avoiding the overhead of additional data buffer memory and the threat of data remanence decay based fault-injection attacks. 2) We show how to implement a BF-MPUF by using eNVM technologies. a) We first introduce the circuit-and architecture-level design of a BF-MPUF for dual-mode applications. b) We then propose a general method to optimize the design parameters of BF-MPUF to maximize both the memory yield and PUF qualities under the constraints determined by the high-level requirements. c) We illustrate the effectiveness of our method using a BF-MPUF design based on STT-MRAM in this paper. Fig. 2 . Procedure of performing a fault-injection attack on SRAM-based PUF utilizing data remanence of SRAM cell. t i refers to the decay time, and t is the incremental value for t i after each iteration. Initially, the SRAM is given a known state M t 0 . The attack tries to recover the intrinsic state of SRAM based PUF (in phase-II) with the collected responses R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R f iteratively generated from the PUF with tuned decay time (in phase-II). A more detailed description of the attack can be found in [12] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the design issues with conventional memory-based PUFs and introduces the basic principles of BF-MPUF. Section III presents our proposed design of BF-MPUF. Section IV discusses the design of BF-MPUF using STT-MRAM technology as an example. Finally, this paper is concluded in Section V.
II. BUFFER-FREE MEMORY-BASED PUF

A. Problems of Conventional Memory-Based PUFs
Memory subsystems appear in most of the computing platforms ranging from lightweight RFID to complicated server data storage system. For those systems that chip area is constrained by system-level specifications, it is beneficial to embed PUF primitives into the memory circuitry and double the available memory resources for both security and storage applications to conserve area [3] [4] [5] . However, some critical problems may arise from reusing the memory for different purposes, which deter their direct adoption and inspire development of countermeasures to mitigate the potentially adverse effects [12] , [18] , [19] 1) Efficiency and Security Issues of Data Buffering: Since most of the existing memory-based PUFs are constructed based on volatile memory, one critical issue is that data already stored in the memory needs to be moved to a buffer storage before the secret bits are generated and then written back when the key generation process has completed (see Fig. 1 ). This additional data buffering and writing back operations not only incur unnecessary overheads in chip area, performance and power consumption, but also provide opportunities for the adversaries to perform fault-injection attack to reveal the response bits. The attack, as introduced in [12] , makes use of the data remanence decay of data bit in an SRAM cell, to recover the information of response bits generated from the cell. The process of this attack is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
2) Design Conflicts for Dual-Mode Applications:
Even if the security issues may be resolved by applying certain countermeasures (e.g., prolonging time interval between a PUF operation and successive memory operations, postprocessing responses with cryptographic algorithms [12] , or memory obfuscating techniques [18] ) such that the resilience of memory-based PUF against certain invasive/semi-invasive attacks can be enhanced, it is imperative to ensure that the memory cells that are designed consistently can still meet the different performance criteria in both modes of operation upon fabrication. Process variations, which are desirable for PUF application, may result in read/write failures in certain memory cells. In the design phase of a memory-based PUF, new optimization strategy is needed to adequately satisfy the quality requirements for both modes of operation.
B. Principles of BF-MPUF
In this section, to circumvent the aforementioned problem, we propose a novel memory-based PUF primitive, called BF-MPUF, that produces random keys without disturbing the data already stored in the memory. BF-MPUF may be implemented more efficiently using eNVMs. 1 eNVM technology (e.g., phase change memory, spin-transfer torque memory, resistive memory, etc.) has desirable characteristics of universal memory such as nonvolatility, high integration density, and good scalability [23] [24] [25] . Different from preserving bit information as charge which is volatile when power is off in conventional memories such as SRAMs, eNVMs store data by exploiting the resistivity state of the Storage Device (SD). That is, it represents logic "1" if the SD is in High Resistance State (HRS), and represents logic "0" if it is in Low Resistance State (LRS). To read the data bit from a cell, a voltage is applied across the data cell and the current flowing through it (I dat ) is compared with a reference
where I H and I L are the current of HRS and LRS states, respectively. The polarity of the comparison is output as a digital bit. Normally I H and I L are also generated from a referencing eNVM SD that is designed identically with those in the memory array.
Due to process variations, certain parameters of eNVM SDs are stochastically distributed, which lead to the random distribution of SD resistances and, in turn, the read-out current I dat . Table I lists the SD structures of three representatives of eNVMs as well as their physical process variations contributors that are commonly considered in [9] and [23] [24] [25] . Consider a data cell with an SD storing a data bit, which may be 0 or 1. By setting the reference current (denoted as I ref ) to be the same as that flowing through the accessed data cell (denoted as I dat ), the outcome of the comparison between I ref and I dat will be random due to the process variations [see Fig. 3 ]. This stochastic feature allows us to extract a random bit from an eNVM cell without disturbing the data already stored in it. The basic mechanism of eNVM based BF-MPUF is shown in Fig. 3 .
It should be noted that since the extraction of random bits relies on the physical random properties of the eNVM cells, its randomness is uncorrelated with the state of eNVM SD. Even if the same cell has been written multiple times with different resistance states, it should still produce consistent response bit in the PUF mode except in some rare conditions when the bit may be accidentally flipped by the noise effects. This is because the variation sources such as contact area and thickness of certain layer (as delineated in Table I ) are constant and have strong correlation to the distribution of SD resistances. Based on the configurations listed in Table I for each eNVM technology, a large number of eNVM cells were simulated by programming them into HRS and LRS before the response bits were collected in PUF mode. The variations in the minimum feature size of device fabrication technology, the threshold voltage of access transistor and the oxide layer thickness are assumed to be 5%, 10% and 2%, respectively. The results indicated that the probability of an eNVM cell producing the same response bit in two alternative states is 100%. Nevertheless, small random noise may be introduced during the state switching process for certain eNVM material, and gain sufficient energy to alter the response bit generated from the same cell in different states under some rare conditions (e.g., at a temperature much higher than the typical range of operation [27] , [29] [30] [31] ). Similar to any other type of temporary noise effects, the error induced by random fluctuations in programming process can be eliminated by algorithmic error correction method.
C. Resilience Against Data Remanence Decay Attack
Compared to conventional memory based PUF, the eNVM based BF-MPUF preserves data bits in nonvolatile manner, and it does not rely on the power-up process to extract the intrinsic mismatch between two memory components. Instead, random bit generation is realized by setting the reference cell to a state identical to that of the accessed data cell. An adversary may not be able to perform a successful attack as shown in Fig. 2 on the eNVM-based PUF because: 1) switching on and off the power supply does not affect the state as well as the intrinsic randomness of an eNVM cell if the cell is properly biased 2 ; 2) regulating the time of power-on or power-off process has no effect on the data retention of eNVM cell because the data preserved in it is nonvolatile; 3) reading a random bit from an eVM cell is not only independent of the already preserved data bit, but also the successive read/write operations on the eNVM cell as long as the response bit from the same cell can be reliably reproduced regardless of its resistance state. Given these specifications, the adversary cannot succeed in the attack modeled in Fig. 2 by analyzing the start-up state of an eNVM based PUF, thus will not be able to recover the response bits as desired. Moreover, it is also nontrivial to take advantage of any other form of side-channel information to attack the PUF. For example, differential power analysis may not be applicable because eNVM consumes no leakage power owing to its nonvolatility [32] [33] [34] . Direct probing or invasively testing the cell will also not work since the eNVMs are often fabricated using nano-scale technology [23] , [24] .
III. DESIGN OF BF-MPUF
Using memory for PUF applications require specific circuitlevel design strategies to meet the specifications of PUF system. For example, devices may be sized small to deliberately aggravate the impacts of process variations for reliable and random bit generation. However, this will in turn increase failure probabilities in read/write operations, which deteriorate the ordinary memory applications. In this section, we will introduce a general method to optimally design an eNVM based PUF that satisfies the criteria of both operations.
Before we discuss the design of BF-MPUF in details, we first introduce some metrics that are commonly used to evaluate the quality of memory-based PUFs. To make it convenient for us to perform quantitative evaluation, we assume these metrics are quantified by the responses of the memory circuitry given certain parameters as input variables. These parameters can be classified into four groups, which are electrical parameters (E), physical parameters (P), environmental parameters (T), and design parameters (D) (see Table II ).
A. Memory Metrics
Memory yield may be significantly degraded by process variations. The probabilities of failure effects are often considered to evaluate memory yield [13] , [35] . In this paper, we consider three types of failure effects in eNVMs. than the threshold to switch the state of the SD due to process variations, i.e., I dat > I crit The failure probabilities may be computed directly using the joint Probability Density Function (PDF) of the relevant parameters, which are assumed to be randomly distributed variables, that is
where F(x) is the criterion function which is formulated as
and P(x) is the probability density function
is the parameter vector that consists of k parameters in P and/or D which are considered as normally distributed variables. Without loss of generality, the parameters in x are assumed to be mutually independent. Hence, the overall failure probability ( f ) can be computed as [35] 
Also, since there are two distinct resistance states in the SD, the worst-case failure probabilities, f −RD and f −RF are of more concern. They are computed as
Since these failure probabilities are correlated with design parameters D, by specifying the metrics of memory applications, the parameters in P can be selected appropriately to minimize the failure probabilities.
B. PUF Metrics
The quality of memory-based PUF is often quantified in terms of reliability and randomness 4 [36] . Reliability measures the repeatability of response bit generation in the presence of noise effects under varying operating conditions. In eNVM PUFs, the reliability may be measured as the amount of noise that can be tolerated when sensing the difference between I ref and I dat . That is, if |I ref − I dat | < , where is the noise current, the random bit generated from the cell may be unstable, otherwise, it is stable. Therefore, the complementary reliability u , i.e., the probability that an unstable bit is generated, can be estimated as
Similarly, u can be directly calculated by using (1) with a suitable criterion function. Just as in the cases of f −RD and f −RF [see (5) ], the maximum values of u in HRS and LRS are considered for the worst-case scenario.
The randomness of a PUF is measured by the entropy contained in each cell, which indicates how much information a memory cell carries. Since the response output generated from one memory cell is at most 1 bit, the entropy of a cell can therefore be computed as
To obtain e , Pr(I dat > I ref ) is first computed using (1).
e is then calculated for each state using (7) . Assuming that the SD has equal probability of being in HRS or LRS, the final e is computed as
C. Design Considerations 1) Device Geometry Scaling: Scaling down the size of SDs makes them more susceptible to process variations. As a result, f will be degraded if the variations of the parameters become larger. This is because the probabilities of read/write failures that may occur when process parameters P are located far from nominal values will become larger. However, 1 − u will be increased because when the deviation of certain parameters become larger. As a consequence, the tolerable noise, when reading response bit from a cell, |I ref − I dat |, is increased. The generated random bits will then become more reliable. Fig. 4 illustrates the changes of f −RD and u before and after the device parameters have been scaled down.
2) Sensing Scheme: The conventional sensing scheme used for the read operation of SRAM-based PUF and other conventional memory-based PUFs is self-referenced and differential by nature. However, the sensing scheme employed in most eNVMs is inherently single-ended. There are two main referencing approaches to read the state of an eNVM cell. The first approach generates reference current with a carefully biased current source. The current source can be designed using bandgap reference to eliminate its dependency on temperature variations. In different modes of read operations, the current source is configured by a control signal to generate a proper reference current. Another approach is to use a reference cell which is sized identically as the data cells in the array. In different modes of operation, the state of the reference cell is switched accordingly to read a data cell.
Typically, the current flowing through the selected eNVM cell is compared with that from a reference that is shared by all the data cells in the same row during sensing. Consequently, as the reference cell is also affected by process variations, the random bits generated from this row of data cells will be correlated due to the skew of the reference cell (see top of Fig. 5 ). As a result of the aforementioned biasing effects due to sensing circuit sharing, the reliability as well as randomness of the generated random bits may be affected [9] . Splitting a row of cells and inserting redundant reference arrays can reduce the correlation because the effects of the skew introduced by the reference cells will be averaged out. Intuitively, when the number of data cells in a row sharing the same reference cell is reduced to one, the sensing scheme becomes differential as in an SRAM cell. However, the area of the entire array will also be increased if redundant reference cells are added. Assuming the splitting factor (denoted as α) is equal to α = 2 i (1 ≤ i ≤ log 2 (N) ), the area of BF-MPUF array can be computed as
where F is the footprint of an eNVM cell, and 2F is the footprint of a reference cell (assuming a reference cell comprises two cells storing complementary data). In some eNVM technologies, the resistance of SD in a cell may drift after many cycles of programming operations [29] , [30] , [37] , [38] . Since a reference cell is accessed and programmed more frequently relative to the data cells, resistance drift may bias the value of reference cell and alter the response bit. This problem can be avoided if the reference cell is replaced by a current source for sensing. Reducing the supply voltage on frequently accessed cells can also be applied to reduce the stress on reference cells. For certain technologies, reversing current flow in read operations can recover the aged cells [29] . Other wear leveling technique [39] can also be adapted for our scheme. Instead of a single reference cell, multiple references may be used. In read operations, one of the reference cells is randomly selected for sensing to average out the stress on all of the reference cells. The aging effects may not be fully avoided but the process can be slowed down to sustain the response quality in PUF mode for the life time of its security application.
3) Optimal Design Method: Due to the conflicting design requirements for memory yield, PUF qualities and array area cost, the design space (i.e., sizing of the devices and arrangement of the array) needs to be explored to find an optimal design point that satisfies all design specifications. For example, f should be minimized under the constraint of the array area (Area max ). Additionally, in the PUF-mode, u of the generated response bits in the worst-case should guarantee that the Bit-Error Rate (BER) of the response bits after post-processing by the fuzzy extractor with ECC incorporated is low enough. 5 The BER can be calculated using (11) where n and t are the parameters of the ECC-[n, k, t], where n, k and t are the codeword length, information wordlength and number of correctable error bits, respectively. Also, the entropy extractable from a cell needs to be above a threshold E min determined by the system requirement. In general, the BF-MPUF design problem is to find the design parameters, D, such that f , u and e are optimized with the constraints on array area and ECC tolerance. Based on the metrics introduced previously, our proposed optimization methodology is shown in Fig. 6 . Our method searches for the most optimal design point under varying temperature conditions. Since our method does not specify the parameters for P, E and D, it can be generally used for all kinds of eNVMs to be designed as a BF-MPUF. 
IV. CASE STUDY: STT-MRAM-BASED BF-MPUF
In this section, we present a BF-MPUF design based on STT-MRAM to illustrate our optimization methodology.
A. Fundamentals of STT-MRAM
STT-MRAM stores data bits relying on the spin-transfer torque and giant magnetoresistance phenomena in certain material. The SD device in STT-MRAM is the MagnetoTunneling Junction (MTJ), which consists of two ferromagnetic layers sandwiching a thin tunneling oxide barrier. One ferromagnetic layer is magnetically pinned (which is called the pinned layer, PL), while the other is free to be manipulated (which is called the free layer, FL). STT-MRAM array and cell structure are shown in Fig. 7 . The MTJ state is stored as the relative magnetization of the FL to that of the PL, which can be sensed as the MTJ resistance, R MTJ . When the magnetization of the FL is the same as that of the PL, the MTJ is in the parallel state (or P) and R MTJ = R P (LRS). When the magnetization of the FL and the PL are opposite instead (known as anti-parallel, or AP state), then R MTJ = R AP (HRS). Hence, different logic bits can be obtained by sensing R MTJ ("0": R MTJ = R P ; "1": R MTJ = R AP ). The distinguishability between R P and R AP is defined as the Tunnel Magnetoresistance Ratio (TMR), and is given by
The MTJ may be programmed by passing a current through it. If this current is larger than a critical value, I crit , within certain period, the direction of magnetization of the FL will be switched (see Fig. 7 ).
Due to the uncertainties in the manufacturing process, some parameters of MTJ may vary randomly. The variations we consider in the MTJ are those in the oxide thickness (t ox ) and the bottom contact area (area). In addition, parameters of the access transistors (e.g., the threshold voltage, V th , and the effective channel length, L eff ) are also assumed to be normally distributed. The variations of these parameters affect read/write failure probabilities of STT-MRAM, and the qualities of STT-MRAM based PUF.
The reliability of STT-MRAM may be deteriorated by the time-dependent dielectric breakdown in oxide layer [30] , [37] . It was pointed out in [30] that STT-MRAM has an endurance of 10 years before breaking down if the oxide layer thickness is properly designed. In our case, the thickness of the oxide layer is 1.15 nm. From Fig. 8 , it has a lifetime of 7-8 years.
B. Simulation and Discussion
Based on the principle depicted in Fig. 3 , the STT-MRAM based BF-MPUF is designed. The architecture and read circuit diagram [40] is shown in Fig. 9 , where the write-driver and column/row decoders are omitted for clarity. The state of the two reference cells is programmed by setting the voltages on RBL, RSLL, and RSLR to provide the I ref required for the memory-and PUF-mode accordingly. After the voltage of the reference cell has been settled, a data bit or random response bit is generated by comparing the current difference I ref − I dat with a sense amplifier. Our design was evaluated in the HSPICE environment [41] and the MTJ was modeled using a publicly available MTJ model [42] . The resistance-area (RA) characteristics and switching dynamics of the MTJ is modeled by self-consistently solving the nonequilibrium Green function (NEGF) and Landau-Lifshitz-Gilbert equation, including the Slonczewski spin-torque term [28] . The RA characteristics was calibrated to the experimental results in [43] . We used 45 nm bulk predictive technology model [44] for nMOS transistors in our circuitry. Table III lists the parameters assumed for the STT-MRAM based BF-MPUF, as well as the nominal values and relative standard deviations of these parameters. Fig. 10 depicts the distributions of R MTJ when a fixed biasing voltage of 100 mV is used. Fig. 10 shows the scatter plot of the randomly distributed resistances of 50 MTJ samples in AP and P states. It can be seen that the same propensity of output state is exhibited in both resistance states of the same MTJ sample.
In memory-mode, STT-MRAM read/write failure probabilities strongly depend on the sizing of the memory cells [28] . If the size of the memory cell is smaller, the current driving capability of the transistor will become weaker, thus resulting in high failure probability of write operations. However, if the size of the cell transistor is too large, occasional readdisturbance may occur which accidentally switch the data bit [28] . When W is large, the equivalent TMR 6 becomes larger as well, and this leads to a decrease in f −RD at some point. As mentioned before, increasing W also boosts the current driving capability of nMOS access transistors so that f −WF goes down. Fig. 12 plots f −RD and f −WF when W is increased from 1200 nm to 2000 nm. As can be observed from the figure, there is an optimal point where both f −RD and f −WF are minimized.
On the other hand, reducing the nMOS size increases its variations [46] . For instance, as an empirical rule, the deviation of nMOS transistor threshold voltage (σ V th ) becomes larger when the transistor area becomes smaller, that is
where A is the technology-dependent parameter. W and L are the width and length of the nMOS transistor, respectively. Fig. 11 depicts the relationship between σ V th and the size of the nMOS transistor [45] , [46] . According to (6), u is evaluated by measuring the distinguishability between I dat and I ref given a certain level of noise. Noise effects in MTJ read operations are dominated by thermal fluctuation, which is modeled as a randomly distributed deviation of FL 6 Considering the impact of the resistance of the access transistor,
T are the resistances of the access transistor in the read operation when the state of the MTJ is AP and P, respectively. angle from the easy-axis [47] . The probability function of θ is characterized as
Therefore, u can be calculated using the spread of noise read current in (6) obtained from the distribution of θ . Fig. 12 depicts the calculated BERs (i.e., u ) with varying W at T = 200 K, 300 K and 400 K.
As mentioned in the previous section, changing α at the architecture level affects the qualities of PUF. Fig. 11 shows the relationship between α and the proportion of bit 1s in the generated 1024-bit response string. It is observed that when α is decreased, the generated response bits skews more to 1s. Fig. 13(a) and (b) plots the calculated u and e with varying α while all other parameters are held constant. The results indicate that both u and e can be effectively improved by increasing α.
C. Design Optimization
The STT-MRAM based BF-MPUF is optimized using our proposed methodology in Fig. 6 . Assuming the BF-MPUF capacity is 128 kb (i.e., M = 1024 and N = 128), and using the data in [48] , we constrain the array area to 2 × 10 −3 cm 2 . For the 2-finger STT-MRAM cell layout in our design [49] , the footprint of the cell is given by
where λ is the feature size of the fabrication technology, i.e., 45 nm. Since f −RD can be neglected when the read voltage is small (≤ 0.1 V) [28] , the objective function at step 5 in Fig. 6 is reduced to
To accurately calculate the probability of failure effects which are rare events in memory operations, the Response Surface Modeling technique instead of Monte Carlo simulation method was used to evaluate (1) [28] . The calculated probabilities as well as the system constraints are fed into the optimization algorithm (Fig. 6 ) programmed in MATLAB [52] to find the solution efficiently. Considering the overall area/energy consumption of the PUF system, we need to take the overhead of ECC code into consideration [50] , [53] . For convenience of comparison, BCH codec that is parameterized by different specifications is used to stabilize responses generated from our BF-MPUF. It should be noted that the selection of ECC is a tradeoff between redundancy and error correction capability. Higher redundancy is required for better error correcting capability [54] . For example, a BCH-[127, 15, 27] code requires 127 memory cells to produce 15 bit output that may have as high as 27 bits of random errors. Instead of using a single ECC, concatenating two ECCs is beneficial to improving both the code efficiency and error correction capability [53] , [54] . 29, 21] and repetition code- [3, 1, 3] , respectively (for convenience, we denote these three codec as ECC-I, ECC-II, and ECC-III). As can be seen from the results, the BF-MPUF designs using three different kinds of error correction codecs all achieve the expected qualities. For ECC-I, since the error correction capability is larger than that of ECC-II, it results in lower u . Also, the optimized cell size is larger than that of PUF using ECC-II, hence the overall overhead and f are larger. Using ECC-III relaxes the burden of redundant cells to guarantee a sufficiently high BER, and that is why it does not have to sacrifice f for u . Table V compares the proposed BF-MPUF based on STT-MRAM technology optimized using ECC-I with some other representative implementations of memory-based PUF in terms of PUF qualities, area and energy consumption for generating a bit from a cell. The area/bit and energy/bit can be calculated by area/bit = area/cell × n k
where area/cell and energy/cell are the area and energy consumption of a memory cell, respectively, and n and k are the parameters of the ECC used for response bit stabilization. The temperature is 300 K and the supply voltages for the referred implementations are assumed to be the nominal values. It can be seen that the PUF qualities of the proposed eNVM based PUF are comparable to those of the conventional memory-based PUFs (it is even better than SRAM based PUF). However, the area and energy consumed for generating a bit are much smaller than the conventional instances because of the smaller footprint of a cell and lower power consumption in sensing a cell.
Since there is no data available in the cited papers about the values of f for the referred memory-based PUF design, we did not compare f . However, the superiority of eNVM for data storage has been widely acknowledged because of its nearly-zero leakage power consumption, comparatively high performance, and higher data retention time over the counterparts implemented using merely the conventional CMOS technology [23] , [24] .
D. Recent eNVM-Based PUFs
Recently, some PUFs that leverage on the unique properties of eNVM technologies have been reported. While the basic idea is to extract physical random properties from eNVM devices for generating unpredictable and random bits, their features and approaches are not entirely alike. The novel memristor-based architecture was proposed by Rajendran et al. [55] for the development of a public PUF primitive. A write-time based PUF was also proposed by Rose et al. [8] using the memristive devices. The PUF of [8] was then used to develop the improved versions of public PUFs in [55] and [56] . Koeberl et al. [7] made use of the weak write mechanism to design a memristor-based PUF. The idea of using PCM to design a PUF with physical reconfigurability was proposed by Kursawe et al. [57] for the first time. Later, Zhang et al. [9] , [58] studied and demonstrated the possibilities of implementing a reconfigurable PUF on an experimental PCM chip. Zhang et al. [9] also proposed an automatic write-back scheme in STT-MRAM to dramatically enhance the reliability of the PUF by 10 6 times. The same idea was also applied in [59] for reliability enhancement to eliminate the use of helper data in nonvolatile memory.
Owing to the different application scenarios and security features, it is difficult to make an indisputable comparison of the overheads between the aforementioned proposals. An indirect comparison of the commonly used PUF metrics that are available in the literature is listed in Table VI. The metrics, φ e and φ u , used in this paper were not included in this table since they were not explicitly evaluated in other works. In this paper, we have introduced a novel memory-based PUF primitive, called BF-MPUF, to overcome the design issues in conventional memory-based PUFs. We have also proposed an optimization methodology to maximize the memory yield and maintain the security quality of our eNVM based BF-MPUFs. Our design methodology was illustrated by using STT-MRAM BF-MPUF as an example and we have evaluated the efficacy of this novel memory-based PUF. Compared to conventional PUFs, the proposed BF-MPUF does not need buffer storage and hence, consumes less area. Furthermore, possible leakage or side-channel attacks from the sensitive bits are prevented, which makes it applicable to a variety of security applications.
